Yearly archive for 2002

Não quero citar nomes

Olavo de Carvalho

O Globo, 20 de setembro de 2002

As Farc são, ao mesmo tempo e inseparavelmente, uma organização política, militar e criminosa: partido, exército e máfia. Dedicam-se com o mesmo empenho à difusão do comunismo, à guerrilha (com seu imprescindível complemento terrorista) e ao narcotráfico. Essas três divisões funcionam de modo articulado e convergente para a mesma finalidade: a extensão do processo revolucionário colombiano a todo o continente.

O chavão corrente de que as Farc não participam do tráfico, apenas “cobram imposto” dos traficantes, é uma dessas obras-primas da hipnose semântica que só a arte soviética da novilíngua lograria criar. Compactando três ardis lógicos entremesclados, a expressão prende o ouvinte médio numa rede de confusões da qual só um esforço analítico superior à sua capacidade poderia libertá-lo. Desde logo, (1) enobrece com uma nuance de imposição legal a extorsão praticada por um grupo criminoso sobre outro grupo criminoso, o que automaticamente (2) força a legitimação implícita, artificial e antecipada do primeiro como governo constituído, funcionando também (3) como camuflagem destinada a sugerir que o referido, levando o dinheiro do tráfico, não suja suas mãozinhas na operação. Mas é óbvio que ninguém pode “cobrar imposto” se primeiro não reduz o pagante, pela força, à condição de seu subordinado e servo. Os homens das Farc são mais que traficantes: são os mandantes primeiros e os beneficiários últimos de toda a produção e exportação de drogas da Colômbia. Mas não ficam só mandando de longe: metem diretamente a mão na massa. Trocando regularmente cocaína por armas, têm no negócio das drogas a participação mais direta e material possível. Dominando-o de cima e de baixo, de fora e de dentro, são traficantes no sentido mais pleno e eminente da palavra.

Às suas três vias de ação correspondem três tipos de associados e colaboradores. Primeiro: os combatentes — planejadores e executores de ações de guerrilha e terrorismo. Segundo: os provedores de recursos, uma rede que começa com os produtores, passa por uma série de administradores, negociadores e fornecedores e termina nos últimos agentes de revenda que passam a cocaína aos consumidores, desde o beautiful people até as crianças da mais humilde escola de bairro. Terceiro: os agentes publicitários e políticos, encarregados de espalhar as palavras-de-ordem da entidade, legitimar moralmente sua atuação, elevar seu status e embelezar sua imagem perante o público.

Muitos brasileiros têm colaborado com as Farc nas três áreas.

O menor índice de participação é na esfera militar. As Farc têm conseguido entrar no território amazônico e recrutar brasileiros para a guerrilha. Mas, evidentemente, eles entram como soldados rasos e não participam da hierarquia de comando. A colaboração brasileira, aí, limita-se ao fornecimento de idiotas.

Outra escala de importância é a da parceria brasileira no segundo domínio, o do provimento de recursos. O Brasil é o maior mercado latino-americano para as drogas da Colômbia, obtidas em troca de armas. Através de seus agentes locais as Farc têm conseguido exercer um domínio inconteste não somente sobre esse mercado como também sobre amplos setores da polícia e da administração pública. Associadas à principal quadrilha de traficantes locais, elas são a fonte essencial das drogas consumidas no Brasil e a origem da maior ameaça organizada que hoje pesa sobre a segurança nacional (suponho que os leitores tenham acompanhado o noticiário da semana passada).

Ainda mais vital, porém, é a colaboração política e publicitária, pois do Brasil têm partido as principais iniciativas de escala internacional para descaracterizar as Farc como organização criminosa e limitar o seu perfil público à imagem de entidade política, senão ética e meritória, que ela aprecia projetar de si ante o mundo e a mídia. Na primeira reunião do Foro de São Paulo, em 1991, dezenas de organizações revolucionárias assinaram com as Farc um pacto de solidariedade na base da lisonja mútua. No final do décimo encontro da mesma assembléia, em Havana, dezembro de 2001, uma declaração oficial “contra o terrorismo”, maravilha da novilíngua, excluía da categoria de terroristas as próprias entidades signatárias e reservava essa classificação para os governos que tivessem o desplante de fazer algo contra elas… Entre esses dois momentos, houve a hospedagem oficial do governo gaúcho a dirigentes da entidade, a participação chiquérrima em dois Fóruns Sociais Mundiais, a intermediação de organizações locais para a pregação feita por agentes da narcoguerrilha colombiana em escolas brasileiras e, por fim, a publicação da revista farquiana “Resistência”, que circula livremente nas bancas deste país.

Se, agora, me perguntarem — “Mas quem, afinal, são esses brasileiros?” –, direi que, no campo militar, nenhum se destaca em especial: são todos anônimos. Quanto aos colaboradores principais nos outros dois campos, recuso-me terminantemente a fornecer seus nomes. Recuso-me a sujar reputações, seja a daquele cidadão que, desde a cadeia, espalha as drogas e o terror pelo Brasil, seja a daquele outro que, convocando e dirigindo sucessivos Foros de São Paulo, assinando e difundindo sucessivos primores do eufemismo universal, vem inoculando na mente do público a crença mentirosa de que as Farc não têm a menor parcela de culpa pelo que faz o primeiro. Se um deles é reconhecido como inimigo público número um e o outro como virtual cidadão numero um da República, isso só mostra que no Brasil o fundo e o topo da hierarquia se tornaram indiscerníveis.

Carta de Constantine C. Menges a Olavo de Carvalho

El día 17 de septiembre del 2002, al leer en el forum http://www.brazzil.com algunos comentarios insoportablemente tendenciosos al artículo del Dr. Constantine C. Menges, “Blocking a New Axis of Evil”, resolví intervenir en el debate, enviando al editor de la página algunas líneas de respuesta a los descomedidos petistas que daban allí un show de patriotismo fingido. Pocas horas después recebí del editor un simpático e-mail, que me informaba sobre su intención de publicar mi texto y, de paso, me daba la dirección eletrónica del Dr. Menges, a quien decidí entonces enviar una copia de mi mensaje.

Ayer, 19 de septiembre, el Dr. Menges me envió una respuesta, acompañada de cuatro anexos, que reproduzco a continuación. — O. de C.

Mr. de Carvalho,

Thank you very much for sending me your thoughtful and eloquent analysis of the current political situation in Brazil. As you know, one of my brief articles, “Blocking a New Axis” has circulated widely by email – I am told more than 400,000 brazilians have received it. It has led to an active but nonfactual protest by many supporters of Lula.

I thought you would find it interesting to have the text of my analysis on Brazil and on the Chavez regime in Venezuela – where I correctly warned about his radical political actions in 1999. Also, I think the list of participants at the lastest Lula organized Foro de Sao Paolo in Havanna is very indicitive, as you discussed in your analysis.

Very important is Lula’s statement on September 14 opposing Brazil’s continued participation in the Nuclear Noproliferation Treaty. I am enclosing that in Portuguese as well as a just-published O Globo story saying the truth that Lula supports Brazil’s having nuclear weapons -a fact that seems virtually unknown to most voters in Brazil.

With all good wishes.

Dr. C. Menges

Anexo 1

Venezuela: Implications of the Emerging Radical Military Dictatorship[i]

Briefing Note[ii]

September 1999

During his coming visit to the U.S., President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela hopes to meet again with President Clinton. In January 1999, Col. Chavez told President Clinton that his political program would be one of “true democracy,” but in fact, he is establishing a radical military dictatorship with ominous implications for the people of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and for the United States as he moves forward with his plans for a de facto alliance with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and communist China. Now, it is up to President Clinton to exercise leadership in formulating a strategy to help the people of Venezuela reestablish their democracy.

Venezuela, with a population of about 23 million, is currently the largest single supplier of oil to the United States. After the restoration of democracy in 1958, Venezuela had been a positive example for all of Latin America and had excellent relations with the United States. Unfortunately, the deep recession following the 1982 and 1994 Latin American debt crises severely reduced living standards where about half of the population had been middle class. This, along with corruption scandals involving both major democratic political parties and the effects of low oil prices during the 1990s, contributed to growing public demands for reform.

During his time as a military cadet, Chavez came to believe that he should lead a radical military regime which would transform Venezuela. In 1992 he staged a violent military coup in coalition with the armed Venezuelan communist movements established with Castro’s help in the 1960s. This was repelled by the National Guard, equal in strength to the army.

Having been given amnesty in 1995, Chavez began to focus his efforts on the political process. He organized the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement, reestablished his alliance with the Venezuelan Marxist-Leninist movements and began working with the communist guerrillas of Colombia who helped his movement in return for stolen weapons.

The first tests for Chavez’s new movement were the November 1998 elections for the National Congress and for 22 state governorships. Contrary to their hopes, the Chavez movement won only 37% of the seats in the Congress and only 8 of the 22 governorships. Yet, as they prepared for the December 1998 presidential elections, the two long established democratic parties were demoralized by public disaffection with them as a result of corruption in government. Only late in the campaign did they endorse the candidacy of Governor Salas Romer, who led a new democratic movement, Projecto Venezuela. Chavez campaigned for the presidency on a program of reform to end corruption, opposition to “neo-liberalism” and strong criticism of the United States. Chavez did not deny that his well funded presidential campaign received help from Libya and Cuba (reports suggest that Saddam Hussein also provided funds). In the election, Gov. Salas Romer received 40% of the popular vote, while Col. Chavez won the presidency with 56%.

Since becoming president on February 2, 1999, Chavez has acted systematically to establish a radical military dictatorship under the guise of constitutional reform. First, he appointed his fellow coup plotters to positions in control of the armed forces, the intelligence service, the internal revenue service, the ministry of the interior and other sensitive ministries. Second, Chavez has created an atmosphere of political intimidation, in which political, civic, and media leaders were called upon to support his changes or risk being charged with corruption, having mobs storm their offices and homes, or finding themselves or family members kidnapped by Colombian guerrillas. Third, in direct violation of the constitution, Chavez has established regional military committees as a form of parallel government in most of Venezuela’s states and has sought to force the elected governors and mayors to subordinate themselves to these military committees.

Chavez called a referendum in April 1999 to decide whether a Constituent Assembly should be convened to write a new constitution for Venezuela. The democratic parties did not feel there was any need for a new constitution. Only 39% of Venezuelans voted, but the referendum passed. In the July 1999 elections held for the Constituent Assembly, only a few persons dared to oppose those from the Chavez movement. This reflected the fear pervading members of the democratic political parties. As a result, Chavez controls 98% of the Constituent Assembly.

In August 1999, the Constituent Assembly acted to neutralize and usurp the authority of the existing judiciary and of Venezuela’s elected Congress. On August 19, 1999, the Venezuelan Supreme Court, having been subjected to hidden and open coercion, reversed its earlier decision and ruled that the Constituent Assembly could declare a “judicial emergency” and establish its own group to “review and evaluate” all existing judges. The head of the Supreme Court resigned in protest. On August 25 the Constituent Assembly declared a “legislative emergency” and forbade the Congress from meeting. After members of the Congress protested and these actions began to gain international attention, there was a temporary, minor compromise with the Congress while Chavez continued to take more power.

If Chavez consolidates his dictatorship the people of Venezuela will experience the repression and poverty that the Cuban people have known for the last four decades. Also, Chavez will seek to help radicals taker power in other Latin American countries beginning with Colombia. There the elected government faces three armed opponents–20,000 communist guerrillas who began with Castro’s help in the early 1960s, these are mainly financed by violent narcotics traffickers, some of whom also fund and use the third armed group, anti-guerrilla paramilitary forces. The actions of Chavez make it clear that he seeks to help the Colombian guerrillas win directly or by means of a “power-sharing” negotiated political settlement. Chavez will also use the slogans of “reform” and “ending corruption” to help radicals take power in other fragile countries such as Mexico.

A key Chavez advisor defines the U.S. Europe and Israel as the “white Judaic North,” oppressing the poor of the world and requiring the Chavez regime to ally itself with the anti-U.S. oil producers–Libya, Iran, Iraq and communist China. Chavez has already coordinated closely with Iran to promote higher oil prices, he has invited Saddam Hussein to the OPEC summit in Venezuela and he has agreed to provide Venezuelan oil to Cuba at a steep discount. Chavez will seek ever higher oil prices both to punish the “North” and to provide his and other radical regimes with more money to oppose it and help “liberate” those they define as oppressed.

In April 1999 Senator Timiteo Zambrano, from one of Venezuela’s two major democratic parties, wrote the Organization of American States (OAS) stating that Chavez was “against the democratic system” and asking for international help to preserve democracy. In 1991 the OAS had unanimously agreed that in the event of a threat to political democracy the members of the OAS would take preventive actions. It is very late but not yet too late. President Clinton has a last chance to work with democratic allies to prevent the consolidation of a Chavez dictatorship-a major new threat to freedom, peace and national security.

Anexo 2

Venezuela: the truth about Chavez

The Washington Times

April 28, 2002

The recent events in Venzuela were dramatic. Yet much of the discussion in the United States began and ended with the fact that President Hugo Chavez had been “democratically elected” in 1998. Ignored were his record of anti-democratic governance since taking office in 1999 , his alliances with terrorist partner states like Cuba, Iraq and Iran, his sponsorship of state terrorism and the implications of these facts for the future.

On April 9-10,2002 hundreds of thousands of peaceful protesters from pro-democratic political parties, labor unions, business and civic associations, walked in the Venezuelan capital to show their opposition the latest anti-democratic actions of Chavez. In response, Chavez mobilized his para-military armed thugs, the “Bolivarian Circles” and they were televised shooting the unarmed protestors killing and wounding more than 100 while others sped around Caracas on motorcycles looking for journalists to attack. Chavez also sent armed supporters to close down television reporting of the protests.

When Chavez ordered the military to use force to halt the peaceful demonstrations, thirty senior officers refused to obey. They said Chavez had violated “democratic principles” and that they would no longer recognize his authority because they wanted to “avoid more spilling of blood and the destruction of our brave people and their institutions”. From their point of view, those military leaders were joining a broad based civic movement calling for the end of the emerging Chavez dictatorship, just as had occurred in 1945 and again in 1958 when a civil-military coalition removed a dictator and Venezuela began its four decades as a political democracy.

Understanding the reasons all the pro-democratic groups in Venezuela oppose Chavez requires a brief review of his anti-democratic actions which have been mostly ignored outside of Venezuela. Chavez moved Venezuela through four principal phases. First, the use of illegal and pseudo-legal means to invalidate the existing constitution (in force since 1961) and have a new constitution written by his supporters (1999). Second, under the new constitution, having himself eligible to be president for two six year terms and obtaining a unicameral legislature that would give him predominant federal powers. Third, beginning his “social revolution” by using presidential decrees in the fall of 2001 to begin confiscating private property. The fourth phase, begun in January 2002 when Chavez established the Political Command of the Revolution under his direct control which would supervise the “Bolivarian Circles”, an armed militia of Chavez supporters who would intimidate, preempt and if necessary seek to defeat the political/civic opposition and the Venezuelan armed forces. This was intended to assure his indefinite continuation in power.

In April 1999 Chavez called a referendum to decide whether a Constituent Assembly should be convened to write a new constitution for Venezuela. The major democratic parties did not feel there was any need for a new constitution, but demoralized and intimidated, they made virtually no effort to contest the issue. The lack of citizen support for a new constitution was seen in the fact that only 39% of Venezuelans voted. Venezuelans voted and passed the referendum.

In July 1999, elections were held to choose the delegates for the Constituent Assembly. Chavez supporters were confident, active and intimidating while those representing the pro-democratic parties were fearful and only beginning to return to political activity. The groups opposing Chavez received 38% of the votes compared to the 42% for the pro-Chavez slates of candidates. Nevertheless, by a fraudulent process the pro-Chavez 42% of the votes was translated into 93% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly while the opposition parties received only 7% of the seats.

In August 1999, the Chavez-dominated Constituent Assembly assembled and immediately took actions to neutralize and usurp the authority of the existing judiciary and of Venezuela’s elected Congress, where Chavez supporters had won only 20% of the seats.

On August 25, 1999 the Constituent Assembly, in violation of the existing constitution, declared a “legislative emergency” and forbade the elected national Congress from meeting. From that time on, the elected national Congress was sidelined; this marked the Chavez regime in complete violation of the Venezuelan constitution and as antidemocratic. Democratic political leaders in Venezuela appealed to the OAS, the Clinton Administration, and other countries to speak out against these unconstitutional actions but heard only silence.

Under the new constitution, Chavez obtained reelection as president and a new legislature where his supporters held 60% of the seats, but the democratic opposition parties held the rest, a sign of their revival. But independent observers such as the Catholic Church questioned the accuracy of the vote counting process for both the presidential and legislative elections.

Chavez now moved to use pseudo-electoral means to put his loyalists in control of the powerful independent labor unions grouped together in the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor (CTV). It has a long history of supporting political democracy, opposing dictatorship, and a well organized membership of more than one million strong. On December 3, 2000, Chavez held a national referendum on whether all the union leaders should be dismissed from their positions. With turnout only 23 percent, the referendum passed. Labor leaders claimed the referendum violated the Chavez 1999 constitution, provisions of which protect union leaders from state intervention. Nevertheless, the CTV leadership was required to resign and run in new union elections for office where 80% of previous CTV leaders were reelected. Having escaped the Chavez takeover attempt, the CTV labor unions have been all the more vigorous in their campaign for the restoration of democracy and opposition to Chavez. They have called a major demonstration for May 1st, 2002.

Actions against journalists have been systematic but hidden. They include anonymous threats, ostensibly criminal attacks, and – perhaps most intended to intimidate- sending journalists verbatim transcripts of their conversations with democratic opposition leaders whether on their cell phones, in their offices, or elsewhere. This disguised repression of a free press will undoubtedly increase.

Internationally, Chavez has established alliances with Cuba, Iraq and Iran, all state supporters of terrorism. He has provided the Castro regime with free oil, probably worth two billion dollars, and worked closely with Castro in support of the communist guerillas in Colombia and other anti-democratic movements attacking nearby countries. Even the Clinton Administration departed from its silence on Chavez, stating in December 2000 that he was supporting “violent movements opposing the government of Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador”. There has been an increasing flow of credible evidence, including from Chavez’s former chief of intelligence, that the Chavez regime has been and remains a state supporter of terrorism through its aid for the Colombian communist guerillas and other radical groups. If and as Chavez consolidates his control in the coming weeks and months, his actions will threaten democracy in Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil.

Anexo 3

Lula critica la adesión del país al tratado que restringe el uso de armas nucleares

Adriana Vasconcelos y Maiá Menezes

O Globo On Line

Sábado, 14 de septiembre de 2002

Ante una platea de oficiales de las Fuerzas Armadas y de embajadores, el candidato del PT a la Presidencia, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, criticó ayer la adeión de Brasil al Tratado de No-Proliferación de Armas Nucleares. Cuando el embajador Marcos Camilo Curtis le preguntó si consideraba el tratado nocivo para los intereses nacionales y para la soberanía brasileña, Lula respondió:

— Voy a ser muy franco, porque dentro del Congreso hay una gran mayoría de parlamentarios pacifistas que considera que Brasil debería aderir al tratado. Pero, como ciudadano, me imagino que eso sólo tendría sentido si todos los países que ya poseen (armas nucleares) renunciasen a las suyas. Porque si un ciudadano pide que me desarme, que yo me contente con el tirabeque mientras él viene contra mí con cañón, ¿qué ventaja saco?

Lula destacó que aún existen tres formas de que un país sea respetado en el mundo: teniendo una economía sólida, mucha tecnología o siendo fuerte militarmente. Según su opinión, el único país que tiene atualmente estrategia de largo plazo es Estados Unidos, justamente porque detenta una hegemonía económica, tecnológica y militar:

— Por eso somos obligados a asistir en TV al discurso de (George W.) Bush que ayer intentaba encontrar un motivo para invadir Iraq.

En entrevista tras la conferencia del Club de la Aeronáutica, Lula aclaró su opinión con relación al tratado. El candidato dijo que la falta de una cláusula que impida a los países desarrollados construir armas nucleares ha acabado por colocar a Brasil y a los países subdesarrollados en situación de desventaja. Pero Lula afirmó que no hay como revisar el acuerdo.

— No es justo que los países desarrollados, que tienen la tecnología de las armas nucleares, no desactiven las suyas y exijan que los demás no las tengan. Entonces todos los países en desarrollo nos quedamos con tirabeque y ellos con la bomba atómica — afirmó, garantizando que mantiene el pensamiento “paz y amor”.

Bolsonaro se queda impresionado

El discurso nacionalista de Lula sorprendió incluso a los sectores más radicales del área militar. Después de oír al candidato, el diputado Jair Bolsonaro (PPB-RJ), militar retirado, no dudó en anticipar que el petista tendrá su voto en la segunda vuelta, en el caso de que el candidato del Frente Laborista, Ciro Gomes, no llegue a aquélla. En su opinión, el encuentro servió para reducir antiguas resistencias de la categoría al petista:

— Me he quedado impresionado. Tenemos que olvidar las cosas malas del pasado de ambos. No existe resentimiento por mi parte, ni por la de ninguno de mis colegas de cuartel.

Paulo Delgado (PT-MG), vice-presidente de la Comisión de Relaciones Internacionales y Defensa Nacional de la Cámara, se sorprendió de lo que Lula dijo sobre el tratado.

— La fuerza de Brasil es su territorio continental y su población. Con diez vecinos y 17 mil kilómetros de fronteras, es preferible tener amigos a tener un arsenal. El pacifismo es una conquista republicana — dijo.

Anexo 4

Serra en Rio de Janeiro: ‘Lula está a favor de la bomba atómica’
Bernardo de la Peña y Adriana Vasconcelos
O Globo On Line
Miércoles, 18 de septiembre de 2002

Aunque dijo no estar preocupado con la posibilidad de victoria del candidato del PT, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, en la primera vuelta, el candidato tucano a la Presidencia, José Serra, aprovechó una entrevista después del encuentro con militares en Rio de Janeiro para abrir fuego contra el petista. El tucano afirmó que Lula se ha ocultado tras el publicitario de la campaña, Duda Mendonça, y el procurador de la República Luiz Francisco de Souza, quien presentó ayer una querella contra Ricardo Sérgio de Oliveira, ex-tesorero de campaña de Serra.

Éste, además, acusó al petista de estar a favor de la bomba atómica y dijo, en una crítica a Lula, que no se hace campaña electoral sobre la base de la paz y del amor.

— Nuestro propósito es que sean planteadas cuestiones políticas. Lula se ha ocultado mucho. Va al debate, está Garotinho. En TV, está el Lula light de Duda Mendonça. Ahora está el procurador petista. Ya es hora de que Lula se muestre tal como es para que podamos debatir — dijo Serra.

En entrevista en el Hotel Glória, el tucano citó en tres ocasiones el Tratado de No-Proliferación de Armas Nucleares, firmado por Brasil, para decir que Lula está en contra del acuerdo y, por tanto, a favor de la bomba atómica. El viernes, durante un encuentro con los militares, el petista criticó el acuerdo, pero dijo que no pretende revisarlo.

— Él está en contra el Tratado de No-Proliferación de Armas Nucleares. O sea, a favor de que Brasil haga la bomba atómica. Yo estoy en contra. Creo que para la población esas cuestiones son importantes. Quiero debatirlas — explicó Serra.

“Tengo el derecho de pedir cuentas”

Según él, su campaña no puede ser clasificada como hecha de ataques al petista:

— Eso no existe, incluso porque personalmente tengo respeto hacia Lula. Del punto de vista político, tenemos el derecho de pedir cuentas. Si Lula defiende la bomba atómica, es interesante que muestre cómo. Si defiende diez millones de empleos, debe mostrar cómo. Eso no se resuelve sólo con frases.

El tucano justificó además el tono de su campaña.

— Las personas tienen que recibir claridad de quien van a elegir. Si es una nueva versión, si es sólo a efectos de medios de comunicación. Pueden o no votar en mí, pero me estoy presentando tal como soy — dijo.

Otro blanco de las críticas de Serra fue la relación del PT com el MST y de éste con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). El tucano exigió una toma de posición de Lula sobre el asunto:

— El MST ha tenido relación com as Farc. ¿Eso es correcto? ¿Qué piensa Lula? ¿Las invasiones del MST no tendrán lugar si Lul gana? ¿Y, si gana otro, tendrán lugar? Como si eso fuese un juego, ilegítimo desde el punto de vista de la democracia.

Serra evitó responsabilizar directamente al presidente del PT, José Dirceu, de la agresión sufrida por el gobernador Mário Covas durante una huelga de profesores en el 2000. Ayer, el programa tucano exibió imágenes de un discurso en el que Dirceu dice que los gobernantes tenían que recibir un varapalo en las urnas y en las calles.

— No vi el programa. Me acuerdo del hecho. Probablemente, no fue el responsable, pero dijo lo que ha dicho. No tengo objeción alguna, y no me indignaré si alguien me saca en TV diciendo algo que he dicho.

[i]Dr. Constantine C. Menges is currently Professor in the Practice of International Relations at The George Washington University, where he also directs the Program on Transitions to Democracy. He has served as a senior foreign policy official, including in the White House as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and is currently completing a book on the U.S., Russia, and China. [Contact Numbers–Telephone 202-994-7099, Fax 202-994-5436]

[ii] This has also been submitted for publication as an op-ed.

Mensagem ao Fórum Brazzil.com

Posted by Olavo de Carvalho

On Tuesday, September 17, 2002 at 06:59:00

Message:

Dear friends,

Mr. Menges analysis is completely right. Mr. da Silva is a main Brazilian supporter of Colombian FARC, whose representative in Brazil is Fernando Beira-Mar, a cruel and sadistic criminal whose gang frightens our people, our government and even our Army. Brazil is up to the point of becoming a new Colombia, owing to people like Mr. Lula da Silva and Beira-Mar. This is not just an opinion. It’s a fact. People who try to cover facts under pseudo-patrioric rethorics are not real patriots. They are just stupid.

Moreover, Mr. Menges is not a US government official, he is just an intelligence analyst who tries to understand what is happening in Brazil. If a simple press article is an “undue interference in Brazilian affairs”, then all press commentary in foreign newspapers concerning Brazilian politics should be prohibited, except those favorable to Mr. da Silva, of course.

To say that Mr. da Silva’s enemies intend to “overthrow the government and remilitarize Brazil” is a huge and cynical lie. Mr. da Silva is overtly supported by the military, to whom he promises government money for nuclear research (appealing to the old ambition of making Brazil an anti-american atomic world power – exactly what Mr. Menges had foretold). Mr. da Silva is very close to ultranationalist military, the most dangerous part of Brazilian Armed Forces.

It’s also a lie that the Workers Party (PT) is not a revolutionary one. Some months ago a political scientist at Rio Grande, Prof. José Giusti Tavares, wrote that it was a revolutionary party and was sued for that. He brought to Justice the evidences confirming his dyagnosis (papers from the Party itself) and was acquited. Mr. da Silva himself admited to his extreme-left supporters that any “light” tone he had adopted in his electoral propaganda is just this: electoral propaganda, and nothing more.

Well, some liars and telling people to read O Globo instead of believing Mr. Menges. Bullshit. I am myself one of O Globo’s columnists, and this is what I wrote there some days ago:

Harvest Time
Olavo de Carvalho
O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), September 7, 2002

After the downfall of the USSR became an accomplished fact, the Forum of São Paulo has been, since 1990, the most powerful initiative taken to restart the international communist movement and, in Fidel Castro words, “to regain in Latin America what was lost in East Europe”. Summoned by the Cuban dictator and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Forum joins the legal Communist (and pro-Communist) parties, engaged in the struggle for cultural and political hegemony within their nations, and armed organizations involved in kidnapping, terrorism and drug traffic. Among the last, the outstanding one is Farc, whose connections with the Brazilian drug market were proven with the arrest of Fernandinho Beira-Mar. There are also double-faced organizations, both legal and illegal, like the Chilean Communist Party, whose armed wing had something to do with the kidnapping of Washington Olivetto.

Perhaps the readers will at first find strange a meeting in which legally organized parties fraternize with criminal gangs. Actually, this association only repeats the old Leninist rules that recommend the joining of legal and illegal means in the revolutionary struggle. In fact one of the advantages of the international alliance is to allow that the promiscuous mixture of licit and illicit ways, of moralist rhetoric and drug traffic, of beautiful ideals and the brutality of kidnappings, of humanitarian sentimentalism and organized terror- a mix so clear and evident in continental scale, and at meetings of the Forum- that it appears disguised and nebulous when seen from the perspective of each separate nation. Using Argentineans to act in Mexico, Bolivians in Brazil or Brazilians in Chile, the most obvious connections become invisible to the eyes of local public opinion: the legal parties continue above any suspicion, and the simple suggestion of investigating them is rejected as an intolerable offense, when the arrest of criminals shows full proof of the intimate association between organized crime and leftist politics in the continent; identification that becomes still more evident when the arrest of such persons is followed, with magical coincidence, by the quick and effective mobilization, for the criminals, of officials and “decent folk” of the left.

Since 1990, the Forum of São Paulo has been meeting regularly. The tenth meeting took place in Havana, Cuba, in December, 2001. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was there. To deny therefore that he is associated politically with the other entities, signatories to the declarations of the Forum, it is to deny the validity of the Brazilian presidential candidate’s signature on official documents of international relevance. As wrote Vasconcelo Quadros in the “Isto É” of March 2002, “Brazil shelters a secret network of support of international guerrilla organizations employed in kidnappings, bank robberies and drug traffic”. In a country in which any phone call to a swindler is enough to place a politician under police suspicion, a countrywide refusal to investigate a link enshrined in public documents it is, at least, surprising.

Still more surprising is that, among so many journalistic commentators, policemen, politicians and the military, all them reputed as intelligent, nobody gets-or wants-to establish a logical link between those facts and the declaration of Dr. Leonardo Boff, in “Jornal do Brasil” of August 23, that with the next election “the time for the Brazilian revolution will have arrived. The sowing was already been done. It is harvest time”. Or, when using the word “revolution”, didn’t the retired clergyman mean anything of the sort, and that all was innocent hyperbole?

The massive and obstinate refusal to face with realism this state of affairs can be explained by the fact that he constitutes a dreadful reality, whose vision would be too traumatic for the delicate nerves of a bourgeoisie dandy, terrified to the point of no longer admitting the reality of the evil that terrifies him. Psychologically kidnapped by a nameless Marxism that permeates the air, the dominant class is already ripe to act its role of docile, smiling and helpful victim.

But, please, don’t think that with those remarks I am acting in favor or against any candidate to the Presidency of the Republic. See this: four candidates, with token differences, have the same ideology, and any one of them, when elected, cannot govern without the support of at least one or two of the other three. It is therefore of a single slate election, subdivided into four temporary denominations. Perhaps what Dr. Boff will not say is that the revolution will be inaugurated with the victory of candidate x or y, but with “the election” itself-no matter who wins. From the psychological point of view, at least, that revolution has already begun: the ideological uniformity, once accepted as the normal state of the democratic politics, is enough to virtually outlaw, as “right wing extremism”, any word henceforth said in favor of liberal capitalism, of the USA or of Israel. Who says it receives regular death threats, no longer with the precaution of delivery as anonymous messages: they are to be seen on internet sites and cause no scandal. Dr. Boff is right: Sowing has already been done. It is harvest time. But all this certainly is mere hyperbole. Yes, it would be a scandal to see some malign intention in such innocent words.

Estoy fuera de Época

Mídia Sem Máscara, año 1, número 3, 18 de septiembre de 2002

Olavo de Carvalho

Adiós, Paulo Mollera

Fuera de época, en sentido cronológico, siempre lo he estado, pues no hay orgullo más cerril que el de “ser un hombre de su tiempo”. He explicado eso en El futuro del pensamiento brasileño y no pretendo repetirme.

Pero no estoy hablando de eso. Me refiero a Época, la revista, de la que he ido siendo retirado poco a poco, a lonchas, en una verdadera operación-salchichón, habiendo salido ahora, finalmente, la última loncha. El responsable por la decisión, Paulo Moreira Leite, no ha tenido siquiera el valor de transmitírmela personalmente, y ha preferido servirse de la intermediación de un director de O Globo, hombre educado que siempre ha tenido conmigo las mejores relaciones de cortesía y que, en rigor, no tenía nada que ver con el asunto.

Mi carrera en esa revista ha sido corta y previsible. Apenas dejó la dirección Augusto Nunes y entró en su lugar el conocido militante o ex-militante trotskista, mi suerte estaba echada. Primero, vino la reducción de mi columna (una de las más leídas de la publicación) de semanal a mensual, con el pretexto de dejar sitio libre para un tal “pluralismo”, entidad enigmática que después descubrí ser la persona de la Sra. Maria da Conceição Aquino.

A continuación, centenares de cartas de protesta dirigidas al Sr. Moreira – que a esa altura pasé a llamar Moleira [mollera] – fueron ocultadas no sólo a los lectores, sino al propio articulista en ellas mencionado. ¿Cuántas fueron, exactamente? Sólo sé de las trescientas y tantas cuyos remitentes tomaron la precaución de enviarme copia por e-mail. Ésas están reproducidas en mi site,http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/. Las otras desaparecieron para siempre en el abismo de tinieblas de la inteligencia del Sr. Mollera. Por una coincidencia irónica, o cínica, éste último, nada menos que en la edición siguiente, ufanándose del gran número de cartas de felicitación que había recibido por un escandaloso reportaje sobre drogas, escribió en editorial: “Las cartas no mienten jamás.” Escribió eso en el preciso momento que escondía, por tanto, trescientas y tantas verdades, quizá más.

Inmediatamente después, empezaron las provocaciones censorias. Primero, el Sr. Mollera podó en uno de mis artículos una frase entera, que seguía a la afirmación de que los lectores no eran idiotas: “Los que son idiotas son ciertos jefes de redacción que se imaginan que, controlando un periódico o revista, controlan la conciencia del público“. Era, por cierto, sólo una sentencia genérica, suelta, sin pruebas ni ejemplos. Fue el Sr. Paulo Mollera quien, al suprimirla, la ejemplificó con una elocuencia superior a mis pobres recursos inventivos.

Después, como me había referido a gays y lesbianas con el apelativo de “rarotes” — un adjetivo inocente que incluso me he aplicado a mí mismo –, el Sr. Mollera dio prueba de rareza aún mayor, al considerar que la palabra era intolerable y hacer valer sobre ella su poder de censura.

Como nada de eso me irritase lo suficiente, la revista empezó a atrasar mi paga. El primer atraso vino con la excusa de que determinado artículo mío había llegado tarde. Excusa inconsistente, claro está. Lo que había pasado es que el Sr. Mollera, que había recibido el texto tres días antes del plazo, había resuelto retardar su publicación. Poco tiempo después, nuevo atraso, de dos meses, esta vez alegando que la reserva de recibos firmados por mí se había terminado – como si fuese algo enormemente difícil avisarme de ello unas semanas antes.

Después de esa larga serie de incomodidades de poca monta, que indican bien la medida de la envergadura del alma que las había producido, llegó la conclusión lógica, justificada como medida de economía, una alegación que, por cierto, no pongo en duda en modo alguno, pues es comprensible que una editora necesite de verdad apretar el cinto cuando entrega una de sus publicaciones a la dirección de un gran espíritu como el Sr. Paulo Mollera.

No estoy, evidentemente, enfadado con él ni con nadie. Sólo dejo constancia de esos hechos para la eventual curiosidad de los postreros y la posible enseñanza de los hodiernos.

 

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